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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that both concepts of “youth” (arabic “šabāb”)
and “generation” (arabic “ğīl”) are in different ways misleading and problematic
when applied in empirical research on Tunisians of lower age. While they are
not affirmatively used and partly even rejected by the latter, they also appear
inadequate when employed as analytical categories. Instead, as I will suggest,
(historical) “age cohort” is an adequate reference category that can be qualita-
tively described according to the shared perceptions and actions of its respective
members. Thereby, the focus on self-concepts and self-narratives appears to be
particularly helpful in understanding the contemporary condition of Tunisians
of lower age and their social mobilization practices. It reveals, among other
findings, that their movements are not primarily directed at political and social
change, though conventionally assumed, but rather express a search for greater
possibilities of mobility and autonomy beyond both state and societal
boundaries.
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1 Introduction
In the media coverage of the “Arab Spring”, the terms “youth” and “(youth)
generation” have been widely and commonly used, often understood as the
principal agents or indicators of social change in the Arab world. Even in a
number of academic and policy studies that were published since 2011, “youth”
and “(youth) generation” were treated as given, self-evident social categories
that were key to understanding the social and political transformations in the
Arab world. For the most part, such works followed a conventional, positivist
approach that considers social categories like “youth” as natural and objective
entities, independent of discourse or perception. Thus, their underlying
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assumption was that because there was a high number of “young people” in the
Arab world who, moreover, played important roles in the protest movements,
the talk about “youth” was justified.1 Furthermore, approaching the contempor-
ary “Arab youth” or “(youth) generation” as a quasi-unitary category, some
studies made the assumption that “young Arabs” shared the same or similar
life experiences, hence developed a collective group consciousness and that, on
the basis of the latter, they acted as an active, unified force for social change in
their respective societies.2
If the terms “youth” (arabic “šabāb”3) and “generation” (arabic “ğīl”) were
meaningful to those people in the Arab world who are designated by them,
particularly in regard to their collective mobilization endeavors, they would
have to be central in their self-understanding and be affirmatively used in
narration and dialogue. The fact that since 2011, both terms have been widely
and emphatically used in the media as well as in academic and policy circles, is
not yet proof, neither of their (subjective) meaningfulness to the people desig-
nated, nor of their (objective) empirical-analytical value. Particularly in post-
revolutionary Tunisia, the terms have been instrumental for various competing
political, corporate and commercial interests, in the context of changing poli-
tical and economic opportunity structures and heightened social expectations
and pressures.4 In a different line of thought, the political scientist François
Burgat noted that the appeal particularly of the term “youth” partly stems from
an orientalist desire to construct an essentialist counter-image to the stereoty-
pical (male) Muslim Other, namely that of a progressive youth wanting to
“become like the West” and break away from its “backward patriarchs”.5
However, aside from the orientalist bias, the term seems to have been used
mainly by default for lack of a more critical and precise assessment of the social
phenomenon at work.
1 See f.ex. Weddady/Ahmari 2012; Honwana 2013; Laiq 2013; World Bank Group 2014.
2 See f.ex. Cole 2014: 268–276; Lynch 2013; Laiq 2013. The following statement by Perthes (2011)
is exemplary in this regard: “Es ist auffällig, wie sehr die heute 20- bis 35-Jährigen in der arabischen
Welt tatsächlich eine von gemeinsamen Erfahrungen geprägte Generation bilden. [ … ] Wenn die
gleichzeitigen Erfahrungen die Mitglieder dieser Jahrgänge zu einer Generation gemacht haben, so
wurden sie seit 2011, mit dem Beginn des Aufstands in Tunesien, dann in Ägypten und in anderen
arabischen Ländern, zu einer politischen Generation, die sich als Akteur versteht und von anderen
auch so verstanden wird” (p. 32–33).
3 In this paper, I will use the transliteration system of the Deutsche Morgenländische
Gesellschaft (DMG).
4 Paciello et al. 2016; Murphy 2016. Somi 2016 describes the post-revolutionary “field of youth”
in Tunisia as “a market in which different stakeholders compete for control and influence on
young Tunisians” (p. 12).
5 Burgat 2013: 7–9.
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In this article, I will provide a critique of the concepts of youth (šabāb or
jeunesse) and generation (ğīl or génération) both as descriptive and analytical
categories in empirical research in contemporary Tunisia. In order to avoid any
sort of bias towards the collective of Tunisians that is designated by these
concepts, I will refer to it as an age cohort which in this study includes all
those Tunisians, men and women alike, who were born between the years 1980
and 1995. Accordingly, they were between 15 to 30 years of age at the time of the
“Tunisian revolution” (2010–2011) and between 20 to 35 years of age at the time
of my ethnographic fieldwork in Tunis (2016).6 Henceforth, omitting the term
“youth” and related terms such as “young people” and “adolescents”, I will call
this age cohort (20–35) the γ-cohort. I don’t attach any prior meaning to this
cohort except to state its members’ general condition, which is that they all lived
their formative years under the Ben Ali regime (1987–2011) and experienced the
“revolution” as a traumatic turning point in their lives being at the time only 15
to 30 years of age. Any further assertions related to the cohort, notably about
their perceptions of age and time, will be derived from the empirical, social field
only within which I observed and interrogated its members in the course of my
ethnographic fieldwork in Tunis in 2016.
In the following, I will first focus on the concept of youth and then consider
more briefly the concept of generation. In doing so, I argue that in the con-
temporary Tunisian context, the collective commonly referred to as the
“Tunisian youth/generation” should instead be approached as a specific (histor-
ical) age cohort and qualitatively described according to the shared perceptions
and actions of its respective members. Thereby, the focus on self-concepts and
self-narratives will be shown to be particularly helpful in understanding the
condition of the cohort’s members and their social mobilization practices.
2 “Youth” representation and discourse
When trying to grasp “youth” in Tunisia as those affirmatively designating
themselves as such, a lack of empirical evidence becomes apparent already at
the level of public self-representation. Before 2011, only about 4 percent of
γ-cohort members were active in public associations and thus participating in
public life. In 2016, still only about 6 percent of the γ-cohort are members in an
6 The Tunisian state defines “youth” as those aged 15 to 29 years. The definition of youth varies
from country to country and from organization to organization. For example, whereas the
United Nations (UN) define youth as persons aged 15 to 24 years, the African Union (AU)
defines youth as from 15 to 35 years.
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association and about 4 percent in a political organization.7 Of these, an even
smaller share participates in groups that define themselves as “youth organiza-
tions” or have a clear “youth” related agenda (e. g. promoting public participa-
tion or political inclusion of “youth”). Since the 2000s, many studies have
pointed out the widespread disenchantment with politics and general absti-
nence from public engagement among members of the γ-cohort in Tunisia.
This general public abstinence reflects a lack of identification with the public
role “youth” and a discursive abstinence from “youth issues” as part of the
public debate.
Under the former authoritarian president Ben Ali (1987–2011), who defined
“youth” as a national priority at his initial Declaration of 7 November 1987,8 the
Tunisian state invested considerable resources to appropriate and coin šabāb/
jeunesse as a normative political term. There was a range of political institutions
that were involved in “youth politics” and dealt with different aspects of the life
of “Tunisian youth” (aš-šabāb at-tūnisī/la jeunesse tunisienne), such as the
Ministry of Youth and Sports; the Ministry of Women, Children and Family;
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment; the Ministry of Education; the
Ministry of Higher Education; the National Council of Youth or the National
Youth Observatory.9 Since the mid-1990s, the Ben Ali government launched a
plethora of national – employment, training, internship, education and other –
“youth programs”, often fronted by the President himself, such as the
“Presidential Youth Program” of the 11th Development Plan (2007–2011). It
also put in place ambitious “youth” initiatives like the International
Symposium on “Youth and the Future” in 2010. It even set up a “youth” oriented
TV channel in 1994 (Canal 21) and a “youth” radio station in 1995 (Radio Jeunes)
that both began broadcasting their programs on November 7, the anniversary
date of Ben Ali’s investiture.10
In 2010, there were about 400 “youth centers” (maisons des jeunes) across
Tunisia, at least one in every town with more than 20ʹ000 inhabitants as well as
hundreds of affiliated “youth clubs” in smaller towns.11 According to Claire-
Hélène Frileux, who carried out interviews with “youth workers” and visitors of
7 World Bank Group 2014: 19; EuroMed 2009: 8; Zarrai 2016: 15; Allal 2011: 55.
8 EuroMed: 18.
9 EuroMed: 19.
10 For more detailed information on youth policy under the Ben Ali regime, see Paciello et al.
2016; Murphy 2016.
11 Honwana 2013: 114–115. The youth centers are state funded and supervised by the Ministry of
Youth and Sports. They promote “citizenship” of “youth” and their integration into society by
providing trainings on social, technological and environmental matters and by organizing
recreational and sports activities.
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“youth centers” regarding their situation before 2011, the youth centers had been
kept under strict surveillance and control by Ben Ali’s ruling party, the
Democratic Constitutional Rally (DCR). Due to the symbolic centrality of
“youth” in the regime’s discourse, there had been a high pressure on youth
centers and youth workers to function as a showcase for the DCR.12 However,
still in April 2015, Maher Ben Dhia, then minister of Youth and Sports, defined
the functions of the youth centers in the old-fashioned, authoritarian way as to
“protect the youth from the risks of delinquency and extremism”, to “develop
their behavior” and to “teach them the meaning of patriotism”.13 According to
various statements in an informal group discussion with male γ-cohort members
in Tunis in June 2016, youth centers have been generally ignored or boycotted in
the last years because of their patronizing character and their apparent weak
infrastructure. I was told that only “children” (awlād), mainly boys from poorer
backgrounds, would visit them, mainly to exercise sports in the available facil-
ities and to use the Internet for free.
In 2002, the Ben Ali regime created a National Youth Observatory (ONJ) as
part of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, in order to strengthen strategies of
surveillance and control in a context of – as will be shown later – heightened
security and stability concerns at the time. Every four years, the ONJ conducted a
survey (Consultation Nationale de la Jeunesse), whose official purpose was to
better know the “reality on the ground” and to gather knowledge about the main
concerns and aspirations of “the youth”.14 At least until 2011, the surveys and
other available documents by the ONJ weren’t perceived as sincere and credible
by γ-cohort members and, moreover, had numerous scientific flaws.15 The Ben
Ali regime also regularly organized a “dialogue” between the “Tunisian youth”
and members of the government that was broadcast by the national television.
However, the “youth spokespersons”, usually from educated, well-off back-
grounds, were not seen as representative by γ-cohort members. In fact, there
was a pre-determined script that was considered as degrading and bare of any
meaning.16 The fact that hundreds of thousands of γ-cohort members would take
to the streets in protest a few months after the inauguration of a “national youth
parliament” in July 2010 and in the same year that the Tunisian government had
12 Frileux 2012. Cf. Somi 2016.
13 Tunisian Government Portal 2015.
14 Infotunisie 2010.
15 Mabrouk 2011: 137–138.
16 Mabrouk 2011: 137–138.
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proclaimed as the “international year of the youth”,17 was only a further indica-
tion of how far apart the state discourse on “youth” and the self-perceptions of
γ-cohort members were at this point.
As Omar Somi has showed, after the fall of the authoritarian Ben Ali regime,
there has been a growing influence of international actors in determining the
youth policy and discourse in Tunisia. Against the backdrop of an increased
international interest in the issue of “Arab youth and revolution/change”,18 the
relative weakening of the Tunisian state institutions, their lack of a national,
cross-sectoral “youth” strategy as well as the persistent economic crisis crippling
the country, a wide range of international stakeholders were able to access the
Tunisian field of “youth”. Since 2011, numerous international organizations,
donors, NGOs and embassies have provided funding, training and networking
activities to “youth” in Tunisia. However, they have been mainly targeting the
most educated and – as will be shown later – Western savvy “youth” living in
the relatively well-off northern coastal cities of the country, especially in Tunis.
Furthermore, they have allocated most of their resources in the strategic fields of
“development”, security and migration control while often acting on their own
authority and – inevitably – lacking a cross-sectoral “youth strategy” for
Tunisia.19
During the course of my ethnographic fieldwork among γ-cohort members in
Tunis in 2016, I never heard the term šabāb being used affirmatively. Whereas
female members principally would not refer to themselves as šabāb, defining it
as a distinctly male gendered term, male members, if at all, used it in a rather
ironic, sometimes casual way, for example when addressing a group of friends
(as in “Hey youngsters” or “Hey guys”). However, when pondering over the term
for longer, many would reject the designation. In their view, the term had been
abused by the power elites. It had been a means to subordinate, control and take
advantage of them, and to distract attention from concrete problems in the
country. As a university student (28) put it who I met in a café in Tunis: “We
17 In August 2010, Ben Ali proudly stated in a televised address to “the Tunisian youth” that
the proclamation of the year 2010 as the “international year of the youth” had been “our
initiative” and had later been adopted by the UN General Assembly (Turess 2010).
18 Leading international policy organizations and donors have dedicated their recent period-
ical reports and studies to “youth” in the Arab world and, specifically, to Tunisia. One can think
of the 2016 Arab Human Development Report entitled “youth and the prospects of development
in a changing society” (United Nations Development Programme), the report “Tunisia: breaking
the barriers to youth inclusion”, released by the World Bank Group in 2014, or the recent
analysis “Where have all the revolutionaries gone – Tunisian youth and their politics”, pub-
lished by the Brookings Institution in 2017.
19 Somi 2016.
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don’t like the word ‘šabāb’ because every time we hear it, we know elections are
coming. But we don’t even feel spoken to. They have always employed ‘šabāb’ in
order to control and exploit us.” His friend next to him, an unemployed teacher of
French (32), nodded and added: “You have to know, we were bombarded with this
word by the politicians and the media. Šabāb, šabāb, šabāb, whew! Frankly, we
don’t care about it, it doesn’t mean anything.”20
3 Youth concepts vs. contemporary self-concepts
The term “youth” is perceived not only by the γ-cohort members themselves as a
politicized term. A group of Tunisian “youth” researchers concluded at a joint
conference in Hammamet already in 2007: “Le statut de la jeunesse dans la
recherche en sciences sociales est surdéterminé par le politique” and posed the
telling question: “Dans quelle mesure le discours politique mais aussi l’action
publique ne construisent-ils pas une image de la jeunesse qui fait écran à
l’élaboration d’un savoir scientifique sur cette catégorie sociale?”.21
In addition to having been experienced principally as a political term – and
thereby evoking various negative associations for γ-cohort members (instrument
of power and control, “empty talk”, term used only by adults etc.) – “youth”
carries more specific meanings that are fundamentally at odds with γ-cohort
members’ self-perceptions. As Bourdieu noted in his essay La jeunesse n’est
qu’un mot, “youth” as a classification by age – like classifications by gender,
class, ethnicity etc. – is always a socially constructed category imposing limits
and producing a social order.22 In Tunisia’s modern history, “youth” has been
constructed as a distinctly normative category and today comprises at least three
dominant meanings. The first one traces back to the optimistic period between
independence 1956 and about 1980, during which “youth” was represented as
an overly positive, even utopian force of change. In the political discourse,
“youth” were often referred to as the future of the modern nation that the
state hoped to build. Whereas the older generations represented “backward-
ness”, the “youth” were imagined as the recipients of a modern progressive
education and the imbibers of a state-propagated ideology.23 Former President
Bourguiba (1957–1987) often also reminded his audience that it was the “youth”
20 Focus group discussion, Tunis, June 2016.
21 Mahfoudh Draoui 2008: 15–16. However, the conference participants did not principally
question the use of the concept šabāb/jeunesse or propose alternative concepts.
22 Bourdieu 1980.
23 See Swedenburg 2007.
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that brought colonization to an end and for this purpose even institutionalized a
“Youth Day” as a new public holiday.24
From the 1980s onwards, a new image of “youth” emerged in the public
discourse, revealing ongoing social changes within Tunisian society. This new
“youth” was no longer considered as the positive force of change that had been
promised at the beginning of national construction. Rather, it was perceived
increasingly as a disoriented, demanding and pluralistic group of people chal-
lenging dominant norms and resisting traditional authorities.25 Moreover,
“youth” was specifically associated with social contestation and struggle follow-
ing the neo-liberal turn of the country in the 1980s.26 The exemplary manifesta-
tion of this image became the bread riots of January 1984, when across Tunisia
thousands of mainly “young” Tunisians, marginalized students and workers
alike, went rioting in the streets, protesting against the government and its
economic policies. Consequently, in the political discourse as well as in public
intervention, “youth” was reconstructed on the basis of a perception of “pro-
blems” that “young people” apparently typically had and created. “Problematic
youth” emerged as the new dominant image of youth, referring equally to
“young people” having dropped out of the school system, having difficulties
to insert themselves in the labor market or living in remote – urban or rural –
“zones d’ombre”, being “at risk” for drug abuse, violet behavior or sexually
transmitted diseases.
In the course of the 1990s, the already negative image of a “problematic
youth” got an additional edge. Against the backdrop of president Ben Ali’s
policy of rigorous suppression of the Islamic political opposition and numerous
crackdowns on adherent groups beginning in the early 1990s, the theme of
“dangerous youth” emerged in the public discourse.27 Militant Islamism came
to be regarded as the greatest threat to a “problematic youth”, as these were now
already considered prone to social deviance and conflict. As the anxiety over
24 Before 1988, Youth Day was held on June 2, one day after the anniversary of Bourguiba’s
return from exile to lead the National Liberation Movement in 1955. After 1988, during Ben Ali’s
reign, the holiday was held on March 21, one day after Independence Day. Today, it is
celebrated on the day Ben Ali left the country, the day of the “revolution”, January 14.
25 See Mahfoudh Draoui 2008: 16.
26 In the early 1980s, Tunisia started implementing various neoliberal policies and economic
adjustment programs in order to benefit from aid, credit and loan programs offered by inter-
national players like the United Nations, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.
However, the resulting market liberalization and privatization processes generated uneven
economic growth, worsened income inequalities and exacerbated social marginalization and
exclusion. See Cavatorta/Haugbølle 2012.
27 Alexander 2016: 55–57.
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instability and terrorism continuously grew in the course of the 1990s and even
more so in the context of the post-9/11 “war on terrorism” rhetoric, it eventually
became common to claim that problems like unemployment or lack of education
could lead “Muslim youth” directly on paths of radicalism and extremism. As an
expression of this, in the 2000s, the theory of the “youth bulge” (when more
than 40 percent of the population are from 15 to 29 years of age)28 became a
popular explanation for political instability and the rise of terrorist networks in
the Arab world.29 Thus, for example, when asked whether he thought if Islam
promoted violence, the political scientist Samuel Huntington replied in an inter-
view with the Guardian in 2001 as follows:
I don’t think Islam is any more violent than any other religions, and I suspect if you added
it all up, more people have been slaughtered by Christians over the centuries than by
Muslims. But the key factor is the demographic factor. Generally speaking, the people who
go out and kill other people are males between the ages of 16 and 30. During the 1960s, 70s
and 80s there were high birth rates in the Muslim world, and this has given rise to a huge
youth bulge.30
Thus, whereas the suggestion that Islam was prone to violence could always be
expected to receive sharp criticism, the idea that (many) “Muslim youth” were
prone to violence was now unlikely to be met with any significant resistance.
Both images, “youth as an opportunity and promise” and “youth as a
threat and problem”, though deeply contradictory, have survived and today
co-exist in the Tunisian public discourse. Indeed, they both have had a revival
in the context of contemporary narratives of revolution and democratic transi-
tion on the one hand and narratives of impending chaos and terrorism on the
other. There is a great deal of both expectation and alarm about “Tunisian
youth” today. Depending on the context and the issue at stake, they are either
celebrated as “builders of the future” and “revolutionaries” pushing for demo-
cratic transition (for example during election campaigns or as part of demo-
cratic social movements) or feared and stigmatized as “disruptive, parasitic
28 The theory of the “youth bulge” was first coined by the German economist and sociologist
Gunnar Heinsohn in the 1990s. He claimed that an excess in the male “youth population”
predictably leads to social unrest, war and terrorism, as the “surplus sons” that find no
prestigious positions in their societies rationalize their impetus to compete by religion and
political ideology (Heinsohn 2003). The theory was further developed and popularized by Fuller
and Pitts 1990, Goldstone 1991 and Urdal 2006.
29 See Bayat/Herrera 2010: 3–5.
30 Huntington 2001.
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forces” (for example in the case of street riots)31 or potential terrorists (for
example in the debate on “young” recruits to militant Islamic groups).32
In post-revolutionary Tunisia, members of the γ-cohort express their dis-
content over many burdens such as the persistent economic crisis, the ongoing
corruption and nepotism of the power elites or the continuous arbitrary practices
of the police forces which all negatively impact on their life chances. However,
as Ted Swedenburg already observed in 2007, “not the least of their burdens […]
are the expectations and imprecations generated by the ‘youth’ of the elite imagi-
nation”.33 Today, this observation holds even more true as already the most
basic meaning of “youth”, which exists since modernity,34 is called into ques-
tion by γ-cohort members. It denotes a transitional phase between childhood
and adulthood in which people are conceded a protected space for their perso-
nal and educational development and which prepares them for the life as an
adult. Since the mid 1980s, there is a critical discussion in the West among
scholars of youth sociology and pedagogy whether this traditional modernist
understanding is empirically still valid.35 However, there doesn’t seem to have
been any comparable discussion on the term šabāb in the Arab world or
specifically in Tunisia where the term is still strongly coined by the traditional
modernist understanding. This is, not least, reflected in the Tunisian youth
policy of the Ben Ali era which was imbued with the so called Positive
Development Approach.36 Still today, in the political debate, “youth” primarily
31 See Khalaf/Khalaf 2011: 9.
32 See Lamloum/Ben Zina 2015.
33 Swedenburg 2007.
34 Swedenburg (2007) writes that “in the pre-modern era, adolescents were usually regarded as
troublemakers, and so it was customary to marry them off soon after the onset of puberty,
giving them adult responsibilities in order to stave off any social threat and ensure uninter-
rupted agrarian and pastoral production. The forces of modernity, and in particular the forms of
education that capitalist production requires, have greatly extended the period of youth and
delayed the age of marriage.” Bayat (2010) similarly argues that “youth” as a social category
and as collective agents emerged with the development of modern cities and the introduction of
modern education which in the Arab world began in the early 19th century: “It is in modern
cities that ‘young persons’ turn into ‘youth’ by experiencing and developing a particular
consciousness about being young […]. Schooling, prevalent in urban areas, serves as a key
factor in producing and prolonging the period of youth” (p. 31).
35 The starting point of this discussion was the observation of widespread unemployment,
lacking apprenticeships and perceived future insecurities among “youth” in connection with
increasingly heterogeneous and individualized life trajectories. See f.ex. Hornstein 1985;
Heitmeyer/Olk 1990.
36 Sukarieh and Tannock (2015) define the Positive Development Approach (PDA) as “offering
a supposedly expert and scientific body of knowledge that provides a standardized and
universal set of principles […] for what we need to do to facilitate healthy youth development”
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embodies potential, development and positive change.37 As an exemplary illus-
tration of this, article 8 of the Tunisian Constitution, adopted on 26 January
2014, states:
Youth are an active force in building the nation. The state seeks to provide the necessary
conditions for developing the capacities of youth and realizing their potential, supports
them to assume responsibility, and strives to extend and generalize their participation in
social, economic, cultural and political development.38
Hence, γ-cohort members reject the term “youth” not only because they perceive
it to be a political term that creates both idealized (utopian) and dramatized
(dystopian) images of themselves. Already the basic modernist meaning of
“youth” fundamentally contradicts their actual life experience: Speaking with
several γ-cohort members about the supposed privileges of “youth” – spared
from working, dedicated to personal and educational development, preparing
for the life as an adult – the least critical remark they made was that only a small
minority of a “jeunesse bourgeoise” could relate to such privileges. Many of those
studying or having studied in university, yet facing long-term unemployment or
working in an unskilled job, told me that they viewed the education system as of
little use or even as counter-productive – exemplarily expressed by calling
universities “fabriques de chômeurs”.39 Almost all pointed out that spaces for
(p. 25). The PDA which originated among community organizations in the USA in the late
twentieth century is strongly influenced by neoliberal ideology and human capital theory. It is
modeled around the recognition of the unique capacities and potential contributions of
“youth”, notably in the fields of entrepreneurship, civic engagement and political activism.
The objective is to facilitate the development of “youth competencies”, a key premise being
“that once these competencies have been identified and conditions created, all youth are
capable of healthy or positive development” (p. 18). For a discussion of Ben Ali’s youth policy
and its modernist ideological underpinnings, see Murphy 2016; Paciello et al. 2016.
37 See Paciello et al. 2016; Somi 2016.
38 Constitution of the Tunisian Republic (unofficial translation by the UNDP) 2014.
39 This observation is consistent with a study by the World Bank (2014) which found that “as
many as two-thirds of young Tunisians are unsatisfied with their national education system”
and that “rates of satisfaction are very low among both rural (33.1 percent) and urban (35.8
percent) youth” (p. 44). The study also found that Tunisia has “one of the highest NEET rates
[Not in Education, Employment or Training] in the Middle East and North Africa Region,
estimated at approximately 33 percent of the total number of young people aged 15–29 years”
(p. 6). Ben Amor already noticed in 2010 that the first victims of the high unemployment rate
were young people and that it particularly affected those with a higher education background:
“En 2004, le taux de chômage de la tranche d’âge 25–60 ans était de 10%, mais celui des jeunes
de 18 à 24 ans atteignait en moyenne 28%. En 2007, ce taux approchait le tiers (31%), soit près
de trois fois celui de la population adulte active (25–60 ans). [..] Le fait le plus marquant depuis
moins d’une quinzaine d’années, c’est l’augmentation sans précédent du taux de chômage des
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their creative personal development, be it physical, intellectual, spiritual or
artistic, were severely lacking and that they would feel less protected than rather
living in highly uncertain and unsettling life conditions.40
This widespread feeling is described in the song „Ḥūmānī“ by the Tunisian
rappers Hamzaoui Med Amine and Kafon. Released on YouTube in September
2013, the song has reached over 29 million views (as of March 2017).41 In the clip,
the rappers show a decayed popular neighborhood in Ariana, a suburb in
northern Tunis strewn with rubbish and rubble, with houses derelict and walls
full of tags. The γ-cohort members all seem to be involved in petty commerce or
carrying out small construction or repair works while looking to get a buzz:
Here you live like garbage in a trash can. Poor, penniless. I get up late, I don’t see time
passing, I don’t even have a watch. Here, you don’t study. Here, you feel suffocated, here,
the atmosphere is pressing. […] I went too quickly from childhood to adulthood, the brain
weakened [by drugs].
The many γ-cohort members who are busy struggling through life, not being
able to make plans for the medium or long term, do not perceive themselves as
living in a protected or preparatory “youth phase”. Hence, they develop their
own self-concepts to give meaning to a life phase of feeling rather restlessly
waiting, trapped in a limbo between an immediate present and a diffuse, far-
away future.
Following Epstein (1973), “self-concept”42 is understood here as a theory
that people individually or collectively hold about themselves, as experiencing,
personnes de niveau éducationnel supérieur. En effet, il a été multiplié par plus de cinq fois au
moins (passant de 3,8 en 1994 à 21,6% en 2008)” (p. 2).
40 Various informal discussions, Tunis 2016. A study by the International Alert Group (2015) in
the two working-class neighborhoods of Ettadhamen and Douar Hicher in Tunis similarly found
that “responses reflect a lack of recreational and cultural facilities […]. Hammams (traditional
baths), coffee shops and internet cafés are cited as the primary refuge for young people, with
the neighborhoods lacking sports facilities, youth centers, cinemas and other entertainment
venues. Responses also signal an absence of places for young women to go to, as coffee shops,
internet cafés and games rooms in these neighborhoods are generally frequented only by men”
(p. 14–15).
41 The video clip can be seen on this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =mz3p3a4EiXA
(2.3.2017).
42 “Self-concept” is, of course, a central concept in social psychology and particularly within
the sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism. Since the formulations of James 1890;
Cooley 1902; Mead 1934, the “self” is understood as a reflexive phenomenon that develops in
social interaction and is based on the social character of human language. The “self-concept” is
a product of this reflexive activity. It is the concept people have of themselves as physical,
social and moral beings.
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functioning beings in interaction with the surrounding world. “Self-concept”
may also be described as “self-ideology” since people are less interested in
“testing theories” about themselves than in their self-affirmation and self-pro-
tection. A shared self-concept is thus a reflection of the intersubjective experi-
ences and narratives within a reference group, but also a reflection of and a
reaction to the responses and appraisals from people outside the reference
group.43 Hence, the self-concepts of γ-cohort members are always influenced
by normative “youth” roles or identities that are projected on them from outside,
albeit, empirically, it is not possible to measure the extent and impact of the
latter. Nevertheless, when studying the self-concepts of γ-cohort members, it
becomes obvious that these stand in contrast to the discussed prevalent mean-
ings of šabāb/jeunesse, characterized by modernist ideology, (revived) utopian
expectations and dystopian fears.
Thus, for example, groups of male γ-cohort members living in a typical
working or lower-class neighborhood (ḥūma ša῾bīya) call themselves affirma-
tively “boys of the neighborhood” (awlād al-ḥūma). When they’re older, they
often use the term “ḥūmānī”. Deriving from “ḥūma” (neighborhood), the
Tunisian slang term ḥūmānī is an affirmative self-concept designating somebody
who passes almost all of his time confined to the community of his neighbor-
hood while not being able to change his fate. The self-concept has an affinity
with the self-concept “hittist” used more often in Algeria. The latter similarly
designates male γ-cohort members condemned to idleness, who spend most of
their days in their neighborhoods standing fixed against walls (ḥīṭ).44 In Tunisia,
many γ-cohort members also use the slang term “al-qā῾idīn” (“the sitters”, “those
who are sitting”), often joking that Tunisians would rather sit and drink coffee
while waiting than simply stand against walls like in Algeria. The term “al-
qā῾idīn” explicitly expresses the fact that γ-cohort members perceive their life
period not as a protected or preparatory but as a (restless) waiting period.
However, as a 35-year old unemployed university graduate and self-proclaimed
“al-qā῾id” explained to me, they understand “waiting” not only as it relates to
the long-term plan, i. e. to progressing in life and eventually transitioning to
adulthood – by marrying, getting a job and/or establishing an own household.45
“Waiting” would also refer to the more immediate everyday life, to constantly
43 See Gecas 1982.
44 Ouaissa 2014: 115.
45 This interpretation could be suggested by the concept of “waithood” as developed notably
by Singerman 2007; Dhillon/Yousef 2009; Honwana 2012. There, “waithood” describes a period
of stagnation in the lives of “young people” as they try to transition from “youth” to
“adulthood”.
On The Concepts of “Youth” and “Generation” 893
being on the lookout for a chance (zahr) to break up the everyday routine, to
change the mood or improve the immediate financial situation.46
Another common, affirmative self-concept expressing the feeling of being
constrained or even doomed to a “provisoire qui ne cesse de durer”47 is the slang
term “zawwālī”. This term refers to both a (prolonged) condition and an (accus-
tomed) way of living with minimal economic means without being able to
change that basic living condition. A zawwālī is not considered as “poor”
(faqīr). Some γ-cohort members would even argue that a zawwālī is not “margin-
alized” (muhammiš) since he usually has respect (qadr) and a wide circle of
friends (aṣḥāb). A zawwālī is viewed among γ-cohort members as a highly
mobile, but restless city dweller, apt at always “finding a solution” (yağid ḥāl),
no matter how difficult the situation is. So, the term equally denotes precarious
workers with basic education, university students with small pocket money and
underpaid civil servants, both male and female.48 Zawwālī became the central
figure of the “revolution”,49 symbolized by its iconic “martyr” Mohamed
Bouazizi, and was widely celebrated through music, art and literature.
4 The claim to mobility
Corresponding to the self-interpretation as being constrained to restless waiting
and inaction, a central claim that many of the self-concepts of γ-cohort members
share is a claim to (greater) mobility. Mainly, this claim is formulated as an
existential demand, referring to spatial as well as social mobility. For example,
clandestine migrants call themselves “Ḥarrāga” which literally means “those
who burn”, referring to the burning of their identity papers as well as the
“burning” of the borders. The name also refers to the migrants’ past experiences
of hindered spatial and social mobility. Thus, as narrated to me by former
Ḥarrāga,50 a central theme in the self-concept is the general sentiment of
being “stuck” (maḥṣūr). Equally important is the notion of “suffocation”
(ḫanga), a widely used term among γ-cohort members to express feelings at
once of constriction, social pressure and personal insignificance. These feelings
are said to eventually lead to the will to “burn” to another place and rearrange
one’s life there. The self-concept “Fils de tortue”, which is also used by
46 Informal discussion, Tunis, September 2016.
47 Meddeb 2012: 280.
48 Various informal discussions, Tunis, 2016.
49 Allal 2015: 5.
50 Various informal discussions, Tunis, 2016.
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clandestine migrants, is a metaphor that refers to the need to leave Tunisia and
count on one’s own capacities as the only way to realize oneself. Tunisia is seen
as a turtle that gives birth to its sons only to abandon them right away. The sons
are thus forced to leave their mother in order to survive.51
Even groups of γ-cohort members for whom clandestine migration is not a
“solution” to their perceived problems,52 use names and self-concepts that refer
to a central claim to mobility. In the context of the nationwide uprisings of 2010/
11, many of them established regional groups of “free people” (aḥrār jandūba,
aḥrār al-qaṣrayn, aḥrār al-kāf etc.) and “freedom caravans” (qawāfil al-ḥurrīya)
that since then regularly tour the country and solidarize with diverse protest
movements throughout the country. In many cases tens, sometimes hundreds of
γ-cohort members from diverse backgrounds crossed together large distances,
even on foot, symbolically transcending social borders between them. Perhaps
the best known of such incidents was on 23 January 2011 when a “freedom
caravan” with an estimated thousand γ-cohort members from the central and
southern regions of the country marched to the capital of Tunis to join the
protesters there demanding the resignation of the then transitional government
under Mohamed Ghannouchi.
During the course of my fieldwork research, I met several groups within
the γ-cohort who referred to themselves as “pirates” (qarāṣina). Partly they
sympathized with the two Tunisian political parties “Pirate Party” (ḥizb al-
qarāṣina) and “Tunisian Pirate Party” (ḥizb al- qarāṣina at-tunisī) which are
generally popular with γ-cohort members. The latter was formed in September
2010, becoming the first African and Arab Pirate Party as part of the interna-
tional NGO Pirate Parties International (PPI). It became known to a wider
public during the uprisings 2010/11 when party members resisted the media
blackout in the country by distributing censorship circumvention software and
documenting social unrest and police violence via social media. However, the
name “pirate” doesn’t only have the connotation of moving freely in the virtual
world, disregarding legal, political or moral borders. To members of the
γ-cohort, the name also evokes the imaginary of a free (physical) spatial
movement across state borders. Accordingly, as a self-proclaimed “pirate”
explained to me, popular culture products associated with pirates are very
popular as for example the Japanese Manga series “One Piece”. In the series, a
51 Meddeb 2012: 334.
52 A study by Silatech 2010 found that in Tunisia “nearly half (44%) of those aged 15 to 29 say
they would emigrate, given the opportunity” (p. 211). The observation of high rates of γ-cohort
members willing to emigrate is confirmed by various studies. Somi 2016 writes that “the desire
among Tunisian youth to emigrate permanently seems to be the highest in the region” (p. 16).
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crew of pirates named the “Straw Hat Pirates” explore a world covered by vast
oceans and full of unpredictable nature forces in search of the world’s ultimate
treasure known as “One Piece”.53
Many of the 2010/11 protest groups from the Tunisian coastal cities
originally were part of a wider anti-censorship movement. Already in Spring
2010, a collective of Internet activists launched an anti-censorship campaign
which they named “Sayyab Sālaḥ”, a Tunisian slang expression meaning
“enough, leave me alone”. Together with an affiliated campaign against
censorship and banning sites dubbed “Nahār ῾alā ῾Ammār” (“a [bad] day for
῾Ammār”), the cyber activists organized highly performative manifestations
both in the virtual and in the physical public space attracting tens of thou-
sands of supporters who were dismayed and frustrated by the Internet cen-
sorship.54 For members of the γ-cohort, the internet is not only a medium to
gain greater freedom of expression, communication and information. Notably
Facebook – which is highly popular among the γ-cohort and to many synon-
ymous with the internet –55 can convey a feeling of taking part in the major
global trends and developments. It also blurs and relativizes factual spatial
and social distances and borders while stirring the imagination of transgres-
sing those borders.
5 The claim to autonomy
As was pointed out by many scholars, the Tunisian protest movement of 2010/11,
made up mainly of members of the γ-cohort, was a leaderless, non-religious and
53 Informal group discussion, Tunis, June 2016. For more information on the manga series, see
Wikipedia 2017.
54 The campaign’s supporters for example posed on their Facebook pages with Sayyab Sālaḥ-
campaign signs or uploaded caricatures ridiculing ῾Ammār, an imaginary figure invented by the
activists depicting the governmental censor blocking access to websites. In May 2010, cyber
activists organized a flash mob dubbed “Tunisie en blanc” whereby they dressed in white while
having a coffee in one of the cafés on the main Avenue Habib Bourguiba in downtown Tunis in
order to direct attention to their cause. See Zayani 2015: 156–159.
55 Many members of the γ-cohort in Tunisia inform themselves and communicate online almost
entirely via Facebook. According to the Tunisian Institut National de la Statistique, in February
2016 there were 5‘690’100 Facebook users in Tunisia which accounts for 52 percent of the
population. It is estimated that 78 percent of the Facebook users are below the age of 35. This
means that today more than 80 percent of Tunisians under 35 use at least one Facebook
account. In the urbanized coastal areas, the percentage rate is above 90 percent, possibly
even above 95 percent. Cf. Tekiano 2016.
896 Jonas Roellin
non-ideological movement.56 It can even be argued that the movement was non-
political or even anti-political, insofar as the various protest groups not only
didn’t identify with any political ideologies. Many of them also expressed deep
distrust in “politics” as they had experienced it, questioned its basic forms and
institutions and refused to be affiliated with political parties.57 The two unifying
elements of the movement were, on the one hand, a radical rejection of the
political and societal status quo, expressed by the slogans “irḥal” resp.
“dégage” – often without naming a person or object – or just “Game Over”. On
the other hand, the protestors affirmed their will to a fundamental change by
calling for values like dignity (karāma), freedom (ḥurrīya) and respect (iḥtirām)
that they defined as basic and universal.58 There were also instances of social
critique directed at specific challenges like clientelism, paternalism or patriarch-
alism. However, these were generally transient and fragmentary and did not
merge into any comprehensive and inclusive political programs that offered an
intellectual and organizational alternative to the societal status quo.
In fact, when studying the various names and self-concepts of the protest
groups, it becomes apparent, instead, that many of them primarily claim
(greater) autonomy, partly related to their claim to mobility. Some of the most
popular groups transmit this claim explicitly, by using strong bodily metaphors
as self-concepts. Besides the group Sayyab Sālaḥ (“enough, leave me alone”),
one can mention the widely popular dissident network Takrīz which was
founded in the Ultra scene of the Tunisian football clubs in the late 1990s and
operates mainly through a virtual community. “Takrīz” is a Tunisian slang term
meaning literally “[busting my] balls” and is used to express a feeling at once
fed up, angry and disgusted (the adjective is “mukarriz”). The Facebook page on
which the group presents itself with the slogan “Takrizo Ergo Sum – We make
revolutions!” counts more than 100ʹ000 Likes.59 Since the 2000s, the group has
56 See for example Bayat 2011; Khalaf/Khalaf 2011; Zayani 2015; Gertel/Ouaissa 2014.
57 See Nigam 2012; Honwana 2013. This is also indicated by the massive absence of γ-cohort
members in the country’s political elections after the regime change. Thus, it is estimated that
less than 15 percent of people under the age of 35 participated in the parliamentary and
presidential elections of 2014. See the interview with Joachim Paul, the director of the
Heinrich Boell Foundation in Tunis, accessible on https://www.boell.de/de/dossier-tunesien-
waehlt (2.3.2017). More recently, Yerkes 2017 observed that “relative to other countries in
transition and democracies, the level of youth participation in Tunisia [in formal politics] is
staggeringly low. For example, according to the World Values Survey, less than 13 percent of
Tunisian youth (under 30) say they ‘always’ vote in national elections” (p. 10).
58 See f.ex. Marzouki 2011: 156–157; Benslama 2011.
59 See the Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/pg/takrizo/about/?ref = page_internal
(2.3.2017).
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been one of the most outspoken critics not only of the Ben Ali regime but of the
general political and societal status quo. Thus, already in 2006, the group was
described as an “anti-parti: expression du ‘ras-le-bol’ des jeunes tunisiens”.60
There are also smaller groups one can mention in this regard, as for example
the group dubbing itself “ḫnaqtūnā – yazīnā minkum” (“you suffocate us – we
have enough of you”). It was founded in 2013 as a reaction against the then
profound political crisis in the country and the perceived ineffectiveness of the
former National Constituent Assembly.61
6 Beyond “Youth”
As was discussed, the concept “šabāb” resp. “jeunesse” has little positive meaning
for members of the γ-cohort. Hence, they disregard it both discursively on the level
of public self-representation and in everyday narration and dialogue. Instead, they
want to be understood on their own terms, after all, as one of their popular
phrases goes: “they [the power elites] have not understood us.”62 In fact, the
self-concepts of γ-cohort members even contrast the politicized and modernist
youth discourse insofar, as they express a great deal of disenchantment with
politics and (formal) public life (e. g. takrīz/mukarriz), a quiet sober, even disillu-
sioned self-regard (e. g. ḥūmānī), and a pragmatic and skeptical view of their life
period as a conflicted waiting period (e. g. al-qā῾idīn). Partly as a reaction to this, a
central claim that they share is a claim to greater mobility and autonomy. As it
seems, “autonomy” is thereby principally understood as vis-à-vis the state
(dawla), in other words as a rejection of state heteronomy. However, autonomy
is also, to a lesser extent, understood as vis-à-vis the society (muğtama̔). Thus, a
recurring topic that emerged in my discussions with members of the γ-cohort in
Tunis was their estrangement and alienation from Tunisian society and how they
felt they didn’t belong or couldn’t identify with it.63
60 Braun 2006: 54.
61 See the Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/5na9touna (2.3.2017). The group defines
itself as a non-partisan civil movement wanting to “correct the revolutionary path” and prevent
the “diversion of popular demands”.
62 The phrase was often used in the context of the 2010/11 revolts. See f.ex. the parodical rap
song “ana fhemtkom 5haltouni” (“I understood you [the youth], they have deceived me”) which
was a statement that Ben Ali made on his last speech on 13 January 2011, to which the rappers
in the song angrily reply “no, you haven’t understood us”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v = oc-qwvsWJQ4 (2.3.2017).
63 This observation needs more inquiry and elaboration. But it can be noted that it is supported
in various surveys, studies and autobiographical accounts. F.ex., Sigma Conseil, a Tunisian
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While the concept of youth is thus not affirmatively used and partly even
rejected by members of the γ-cohort, it also seems inadequate when employed as
an analytical category in the classic modernist sense of the term. For members of
the γ-cohort are likely to be unsatisfied with their education, unemployed and/or
working in precarious conditions. Most of them are also highly uncertain, often
even fearful of their future. Moreover, modern agencies of socialization (state,
education, labor market, media, civil society) generally lack credibility,64 hence
they can hardly provide orientation to members of the γ-cohort and integrate
them as “the youth” anymore. At the same time, these agencies of socialization
have trouble controlling the life-worlds, notably of female γ-cohort members, in
the context of rapid (sub-)urban growth, the expansion of the informal sector,
the reduction in the size and importance of the family and, especially, the steady
penetration of ever evolving information and communication technologies. As
an indication of this, there are said to be fundamental comprehension difficul-
ties between “adults” and “youth” today. This is reflected, partly, in the country-
wide popularity of Tunisian Hip Hop, the significance of the “Ultra” fan culture
with its secret communication and codes (e. g. in football chants), the massive
spread of – often cryptic – graffiti and tags in the urban public sphere and in
general in an innovative, albeit often rough “youth slang” that apparently differs
strongly from the standard Tunisian dialect.65
Therefore, it seems that characteristic for members of the γ-cohort in con-
temporary Tunisia is less a renegotiation or productive contestation of the norms
and standards of a supposedly unambiguous adult society but rather individual
and collective “search movements”66 under conditions of insecurity and ambiva-
lence. These movements cannot be adequately understood with modernist con-
cepts like “avant-garde”, “counter culture” or “youth culture”. They define
themselves as non-ideological and non-political (or even anti-political). Their
belief in the progress of society has generally faded and they see themselves in
pragmatic, immediately local and transnational terms.
It can be added that the term “youth” in the singular is generally misleading
today. In a complex, open and diverse society, “youth” can’t be viewed as a
market research company, declared in a press release in November 2016 strikingly: “La Tunisie
ne signifie rien pour 50% des jeunes” (African Manager 2016).
64 See World Bank Group 2014: 19; Lamloum/Ben Zina 2015; International Alert Group 2015;
Khalaf/Khalaf 2011: 7–32.
65 Various informal discussions in Tunis in 2016, i.a. with university and middle school
teachers and supervisors of Tunisian youth centers. Cf. Essid 2015: 58–67; Baraket/Belhassine
2016; Euromed 2009.
66 Ziehe 1991.
On The Concepts of “Youth” and “Generation” 899
similarly structured life phase of all peers anymore.67 Especially in a strongly
stratified society like Tunisia, people of any age cohort experience highly vary-
ing trajectories and transitions depending on their gender, socio-economic back-
ground, the area they live in, their education etc. Also, clear lines of
demarcation between “youth” and “adulthood” today are replaced by transi-
tions that occur in different societal domains (education, work, family life, legal
status etc.) at different stages in life. Furthermore, specifically in Tunisia, it
seems that because traditional transition processes and practices to adulthood
are increasingly lacking (marriage, first regular job, establishment of an own
household) and/or seen as of little relevance (graduation, military service, age of
majority), γ-cohort members either construct their own “transitions” or they
remain without them.
Thus, Amin Allal (2011) has observed that groups of male γ-cohort members
in working/lower class neighborhoods (ḥūma ša῾bīya) in Tunis, referred to as
“awlād al-ḥūma”, were accorded the status of “men” by the residents of their
neighborhoods after they participated in the “revolution” (thawra). The “boys”
fought the police forces of the former Ben Ali regime and reestablished security
after the latter left their neighborhood in January 2011. By so doing, they started
perceiving themselves and were perceived as both “revolutionaries” (thuwwār)
and “[real] men” (riğāl).68 It would be interesting to explore further the question
in what ways γ-cohort members use a traumatic transitory experience they
collectively and actively participated in, to assume a more evolved status. It
can be assumed that, similarly to thuwwār, male ḥarrāga or even mujāhidīn
(“those who are engaged in Jihad”)69 inter-subjectively develop a sense of
manhood on and after their – real or perceived – passage to a new stage of
life. However, it appears that such self-constructed transitions are often gen-
dered, at least in regard to males, i. e. “boys” (awlād) become “men” (riğāl). In
fact, as the primary institutionalized peer groups which exist in the life of
Tunisian males are termed as groups of “boys” – most importantly the “awlād
al-ḥūma” (boys of the neighborhood), the “awlād li-klās” (boys of the class) and
the “awlād al-ğam῾aya” (boys of the sports team) – their “naturally” subsequent
67 See Hornstein 1985; Heitmeyer/Olk 1990.
68 Allal 2011: 53–67. Cf. Wiedemann 2012.
69 According to a report by the Soufan Group (2015), an estimated six thousand Tunisians,
most in their 20s, have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State (IS), as of October
2015. Tunisia is estimated as the country that accounts for the most foreign fighters in the ranks
of the IS in Syria and Iraq. In addition, thousands more have crossed the Libyan border to fight
for the IS and other jihadist groups in the adjacent region.
900 Jonas Roellin
status is the status of “men”, which is thus, in practice, often assumed directly –
passing by the status of “youth”.
7 Is there a generation (yet)?
As the term “šabāb” resp. “jeunesse” appears inadequate both as a descriptive
and an analytical category, the question is raised whether the term “ğīl” resp.
“génération” helps to understand the contemporary status of γ-cohort members.
According to Karl Mannheim’s classical definition of generations70 – the starting
point of almost every account of the sociology of generations – generations are
“sources of opposition, challenging existing societal ideas and structures and,
through collective organization, bring about social change.”71 The fact that
members of an age cohort experience historical events from the same or similar
vantage point is not sufficient to characterize them as a generation. Mannheim
argued, that a generation becomes an “actuality” only when the members of the
age cohort become conscious of themselves as constituting a group and mobilize
as an active force for social change.
Undoubtedly, members of the γ-cohort have been bonded together by the
traumatic event of the “revolution” 2010/11 which has been positively evaluated
in numerous accounts as “their” revolution – denominating it the “youth revo-
lution”, “Facebook (or Twitter) revolution”, “Hip Hop Revolution”72 and so forth.
Also, times of upheaval and accelerated social change can help to “actualize” a
generation since conditions of life change dramatically and lower age cohorts
have increased opportunities to realize social change. Yet, some empirical
observations indicate that the term “generation” referred to the Tunisian context
may be an exaggeration and that, in any case, it is too early to tell.
As was already touched upon, members of the γ-cohort expressed a radical
rejection of the political and societal status quo during the “revolution” and
affirmed their will to a fundamental change by calling for values perceived to be
basic and universal. There were also instances of social critique, however, these
were generally transient and fragmentary and did not merge into any compre-
hensive concepts and programs that posed an intellectual and organizational
alternative to the societal status quo.
One of the factors pertaining to this lack of a sustained challenge towards
societal ideas and structures may be the fact that the existing social critique
70 Mannheim 1928/1929: 157–185, 309–330.
71 Mannheim cit. in Edmunds/Turner 2002: 4.
72 F.ex. Peisner 2011; O’Keefe 2011.
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generally employs a hegemonic social justice discourse of Western origin and
particular French coining. There is a sense of “borrowing language and ideas”73
that undermines the self-perception of being part of a supposedly novel, pro-
ductive generation that challenges the former one. Somi (2016) observes in this
regard that
it is essential for a young Tunisian involved in civil society organizations to master French
and, increasingly, English. […] As a result, the most prominent figures of Tunisian youth
organizations communicate in a kind of Newspeak that merges Arabic, often reduced to its
most common phrases, and French and English, the languages of modern technique and
the privileged vehicles of elaborated concepts.
According to Somi, the (neoliberal) social justice discourse confines the activists
in issues and themes, such as health, environment, citizenship or entrepreneur-
ship, “that neutralize the possibility for them to be in any way critical of the
international order, and, therefore, to aspire to change it.”74
Another factor is that in contemporary Tunisia, conditions of economic
advancement and social emancipation are generally very limited for members
of the γ-cohort. In the course of my field research, many interlocutors mentioned
being demoralized and worn out after years of “waiting” for better conditions.
This comes as no surprise considering their labor situation: If the unemployment
of γ-cohort members was already a problem in the years before 2011, ranging
around 30 percent, five years later it is even worse with an estimated 35 to 40
percent. Moreover, as Yerkes (2017) observes, “five years after the revolution […]
half of university graduates under 35 are unemployed and it takes university
graduates an average of six years to find a stable job.”75 As is well known,
economic growth and developing social welfare were important conditions for
the rise of the European “1968 generation”.76 In Tunisia, by contrast, most
73 “isti῾ārat al-῾uqūl”, literally meaning “borrowing minds”: This is how the discourse was
characterized by a member (26) of a politically active civil society association during an
informal discussion in March 2016 in Tunis.
74 Somi 2016: 10.
75 Yerkes 2017: 17.
76 The European and American generation(s) of 1968 have often been used as a reference point
for the contemporary Arab/Tunisian “(youth) generation(s)”. However, the differences are
considerable, not only in view of the different economic conditions: The 1968 movement was
the culmination of a long period of intense political debates and struggles that had been
developing since the mid 1950s (civil rights movement, opposition to the Vietnam War,
women’s liberation movement, critique of capitalism and consumerism etc.). Students,
Workers, Women, “Blacks”, all participated as distinct social groups, zealous with ideology
and engaged in years-long, intense intellectual debates. On the other hand, in Tunisia in 2011, a
popular revolt erupted in which diverse social groups participated, albeit as part of a general
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members of the γ-cohort struggle to make a living in the first place and live
within relatively narrow legal and moral constraints. Thus, they have little
opportunity to engage in their creative development, aspire for change, and,
accordingly, their more immediate concerns are relative poverty, social inequal-
ity and lack of solidarity.77
Thirdly, as was discussed, the most popular movements among the γ-cohort
can be regarded as search movements. They don’t primarily offer intellectual
and organizational alternatives to the societal status quo. Rather, they express
an ongoing pragmatic search for greater mobility and autonomy. Society to them
is not a compelling, normative frame anymore and they do not view themselves
as “avant-gardist”. Instead, they yearn to be part of global consumer and event
trends and view themselves in individualist, immediately local and transna-
tional terms.
Fourthly, as the findings of my field research indicate, contemporary lower
age cohorts in Tunisia are considerably fragmented. They are marked by deep
divisions mainly of class, region and gender. Accordingly, as was already dis-
cussed, the life conditions vary strongly and the existence of a “generational
consciousness” is rather questionable. It is revealing in this regard, that some
groups within the γ-cohort see the formation of a “generation” as an ideal and a
project for the future, not as something already accomplished. Exemplary for
such a group is the “new generation movement” (ḥaraka ğīl ğadīd) founded in
2009. On its Facebook page which counts over 15ʹ000 Likes, it presents itself as
following:
The ‘new generation movement’ […] is basically a framework of struggle, a circle of
reflection and a program for change. It is neither a political party, nor an association,
nor a youth movement in the sense prevailing today.78
In the view of the movement, the “revolution” was the constitutive event in the
formation of a “new generation”. However, due to numerous political and social
movement of discontent, radically opposed to the political and societal status quo. The seeds of
revolt began to show only a few years earlier, manifestly from 2008 on when large-scale protests
and strikes broke out in the mining area around Gafsa. However, no intellectual leaders,
ideological groups or revolutionary blueprints have emerged since, neither before 2011, nor
after. Cf. Lopez 2002; Rizk 2014.
77 Various informal discussions in Tunis in 2016.
78 „ʾinna ḥaraka ğīl ğadīd [ … ] bi-l-ʾasās ʾiṭār niḍāl wa-ḥalqat tafkīr wa-barnāmağ li-t-taġyīr,
laysat ḥizban siyāsīyan wa-lā ğam῾īya wa-lā ḥaraka šabābīya bi-l-ma῾nā as-sāʾid al-yawm.“ See
the Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/mouvement.nouvelle.generation/?fref = ts
(2.3.2017).
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constraints, it would still be in its precarious early stages and become a unified
force only in the future, albeit as a generation transcending national borders:
The new generation movement is a grand project for humanity. The event of December 17
2010 was a signal, a call for all people, a general invitation for all the activists to arrive in
Tunisia and see what the young Tunisians have made.79
The movement’s members envision a “new generation” as a politically active and
self-conscious cohort, which corresponds to Mannheim’s definition of generation,
notwithstanding the transnational character. They believe that the exclusionary
rule of the “old” power elites and the disparities and contradictions within
their own age cohort are the main reasons why such a generation hasn’t (yet)
“actualized” and created alternative forms of political and social organization.
However – representative of an albeit small minority of politically engaged γ-cohort
members – they also believe that new ideas and concepts are in a development
process that had only just begun, initiated by a “revolutionary”movement that had
been leaderless, socially inclusive and free of pre-fabricated ideologies.80
It can be concluded that both concepts šabāb/jeunesse and ğīl/génération,
though conventionally used, are in many ways misleading and problematic when
applied in empirical research on members of the γ-cohort in Tunisia. I suggest that
the latter – as was done in this study – are approached as a specific (historical)
age cohort and qualitatively described according to their shared perceptions and
actions. Thereby, attention should be paid to their collective self-concepts and
self-narratives as these prove to be significantly popular and meaningful. After all,
during the Arab and, specifically, Tunisian uprisings of 2010/11, one could witness
highly performative practices of collective self-representation among members of
the γ-cohort in the (global) public sphere.81 Their principal purpose may have
been to express and assert themselves and claim their freedom to do so beyond
imposed categories, their meanings and limitations.
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